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A NEW NEW DEAL?

THE EDITORS

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THE MORAL UN-NEUTRALITY OF SCIENCE

C. P. SNOW

Reflections on the Cuban Revolution

PAUL A. BARAN

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NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

From the moment our Cuba book was published, in July 1960, we have been swamped with requests that we bring it out in paperback form "so it can get the wide distribution it deserves." We agreed that the idea was a good one, but none of the paperback houses to whom we offered the book would take it. Now, at long last, MR Press is in a position to do the job itself: we hereby announce the publication of *Cuba: Anatomy of A Revolution* as a paperback as well as in cloth, incorporating into one expanded edition the original book plus the later chapter entitled "Epilogue-Cuba Revisited," and including 16 pages of pictures.

Unfortunately, ours is not a "low-priced" paperback. The 50¢ paperback is possible only for those publishers who have a countrywide distribution system covering drug stores, supermarkets, and railway terminals, as well as regular bookstores; with such a huge network of outlets, press runs can go into the hundreds of thousands with all the attendant economies that go with mass production. Thus, the first press run of the excellent paperback, *Listen, Yankee,* by C. Wright Mills, was 175,000 copies, enabling the publisher, Ballantine Books, to price the book at 50¢. And Ballantine's manufacturing cost *for the entire book* was less than *the binding cost alone* of our paperback *Cuba.*

That, in brief, is the economics of paperback publishing which dictates the price of our *Cuba* paperback. It will sell for $1.75 per copy, exactly half the price of our cloth book. In every respect but the cover,

(*continued on inside back cover*)

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A NEW NEW DEAL?

As we write, a week before the inauguration of President Kennedy, the whole country is wondering what to expect of the new administration.

At least among the intellectuals, who were in their great majority Kennedy supporters during the campaign, there is much optimism and even not a little euphoria. An economist friend, returning from the annual meetings of the American Economic Association, held during the Christmas-New Year's week in St. Louis, described the atmosphere as that of a congress of victors. After eight years in the wilderness, the eggheads are going back to Washington in force. And the result, we are assured, will be a new New Deal designed, like that of Franklin D. Roosevelt three decades ago, to provide remedies for the nation's ills, solutions to its problems.

But will this really be the outcome? Is the present historical context significantly similar to that of 1932-1933? Could *any* administration, no matter how lavishly equipped with brains and skills, hope to control the great impersonal forces which dominate the society of monopoly capitalism? These are questions which serious men and women will seek to answer, not in accordance with their wishes but on the basis of the best assessment they can make of the hard facts of an incredibly complex national and international situation.

There can, of course, be no question about the need for a new New Deal. We are in a recession, the fourth since World War II, and no less an authority than Professor Paul A. Samuelson, the new president of the American Economic Association, has declared that this latest recession "has been superimposed upon an economy which, in the last few years, has been sluggish and tired."* Official unemployment figures, which greatly understate the amount of unutilized labor power available to the economy, showed 4.5 million idle in December, well over 6 percent of the civilian labor force. Even the most optimistic

* From the report of a task force appointed by Mr. Kennedy to look into the state of the economy. *Wall Street Journal,* January 6.

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forecasts, envisaging recovery in the second half of 1961, do not predict a major upswing or a marked decline in unemployment. The more pessimistic variants anticipate a recession of old-fashioned dimensions, with unemployment once again approaching the sickening heights of the 1930's. And while these millions of workers remain idle, standing as it were outside the gates of factories which, according to the latest McGraw-Hill survey, are running at less than 80 percent of capacity, the list of the country's urgent needs grows longer daily. The scandal of poverty and deprivation in the midst of potential plenty is with us again, and no one, not even the high priests of private enterprise, believes that it will go away by itself.

Thus the case for vigorous and far-reaching government action could hardly be clearer. Nor is there any mystery about what kind of action is needed. The problem is not to stimulate investment, despite the contrary opinion of a whole chorus of pundits and economists(many of whom should know better). As we pointed out last month, the United States already has unused productive capacity greater than the total possessed by West Germany, and a remarkably well sustained level of investment is adding more capacity all the time. What is now required is a resolute expansion of consumption, both private and public. Although there can be no doubt about the starvation of what J. K. Galbraith and others call the "public sector," the notion, also propagated by Galbraith, that except for "residual" pockets of poverty the age of plenty has already arrived for the American people, can only be described as a cruel mockery. Counting the unemployed, the distressed areas, the large underprivileged racial minorities, and the many millions of other families whose incomes are under $4,000 a year, we can hardly avoid the conclusion that FDR's "one third of a nation ill-fed, ill-clothed, and ill-housed" is today an understatement. The primary need of these people is simple: more income. And the whole country needs more and better educational facilities at all levels, improved health services, more decent houses, renewed urban environments, a transport system that will relieve the increasingly unbearable congestion of highways and city streets—the country needs these things and a hundred more that only collective action can provide.

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The need is there, the human and material resources are there. The question is whether we can expect appropriate action by the Kennedy administration to bring them together in an effective program.

Let us make the most favorable possible assumption, that the Congress is willing to give Mr. Kennedy's braintrusters their head. Can even the cleverest of them devise measures which would have the desired effect of vigorously expanding private and public consumption while still remaining within the framework of monopoly capitalism? We seriously doubt it. What is required is a higher total Gross National Product with a much larger share of it going to the lower-income groups and the public sector. That implies not only a sharp increase in government spending (both transfer payments and purchases of goods and services) but also a drastic revision of the tax structure to extract from the giant corporations and the upper-income groups the revenues needed to maintain a reasonable balance between the government's intake and outlay. If such a balance is not maintained, the effort would be bound to produce an inflation much more severe than anything we have experienced in the last ten years. If it is maintained by extracting revenues from the lower income classes, the whole purpose would be vitiated.

The question then becomes the following: can a serious redistributive program be implemented by means of taxation and without widespread direct controls over corporate price and production policies? Again, we doubt it. Taxes may be levied on profits and profit-derived incomes, but there is no way short of price controls to prevent monopolistic corporations from passing the taxes along in the form of higher prices. If they do pass them along in this way—and it is obviously to their interest to do so—the result of a sustained effort to redistribute income through profits taxation could be almost as inflationary as a permanently unbalanced budget.

As to direct controls, there is no reason to suppose that they could be successfully imposed in peacetime. The business community would be violently opposed, and it has ample means for frustrating or corrupting the controllers. But there is no need to argue the point here. Not only would the Congress refuse to grant the necessary powers, but Kennedy's braintrusters haven't

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the slightest intention of asking for them. They are one and all apostles of the sovereign virtues of fiscal policy. They have yet to learn that the very same monopolistic forces that have brought the economy to its present sorry plight are also powerful enough to wreck or pervert any program designed to force the private economy to serve the public welfare.

Let us turn now to the realm of international affairs where the situation of the United States appears in a no less gloomy light. To say, as Mr. Kennedy did during the campaign, that American prestige abroad has been declining is a hardly surpassable understatement. That the United States is moving rapidly toward isolation in a hostile world would be a more accurate description of what has been happening during the last decade. The fact that it is still supported by (more or less) loyal imperialist allies is scant comfort at a time when world imperialism as a whole suffers one crushing blow after another as the weight and influence of the socialist bloc grows and is thrown behind the struggles of the hungry nations for independence and economic development. Meanwhile, in a world longing for peace and disarmament, Washington's stubborn refusal even to agree to a cessation of A-bomb tests steadily enhances the danger of thermonuclear war by allowing or forcing other nations into the "atomic club" and thus ultimately yielding the power of decision over the survival of humanity to Herr Strauss or the French chauvinists or the race-mad fascists of South Africa. As in the domestic economic realm, here too the need for a New Deal could hardly be more obvious.

And yet what can be expected of people whose first commitment is to "freedom," a word which means to them not the liberation of humanity from sub-human conditions but the preservation of private property and private enterprise? We can at least hope for an agreement to halt testing. For if anything is certain it is that the spread of nuclear weapons has no relation to the promotion of freedom in any conceivable sense of the word, and this fact is surely understood by many of Kennedy's scientific and political advisors. But beyond an agreement to ban testing, it is hard to see how the new administration, given the fact that its overall objectives are the same as those of the old administration, can break with the policies of its

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predecessors in any fundamental way.

Real disarmament, in the present tired state of the economy, would turn stagnation into deep depression. It would also mean, as Professor Joseph P. Morray brilliantly demonstrated in these pages last June, the almost immediate loss to the "free world" (read: free-enterprise world) of a large number of underdeveloped countries. Such are not the desires of the new rulers in Washington.

Economic aid to underdeveloped countries, long the theme song of such Kennedy advisers as Stevenson and Bowles, can accomplish very little in the context of a policy designed to preserve private-enterprise economies. What these countries need first, *before* they can make any constructive use of foreign aid, is a social revolution throwing out old, discredited, and corrupt ruling classes, socializing the key sectors of their economies, bringing young and vigorous leadership to the helm, and arousing the hopes and latent energies of the popular masses. In Latin America, for example, every country without exception needs the kind of revolution that Cuba already has. And yet Messrs. Stevenson and Bowles are quite explicit that the expanded program of aid to Latin America which they favor would be intended precisely to *prevent* the spread of *Fidelismo*. In their view, economic assistance is a weapon to fight revolution, not to complement it. But the most they can accomplish by such means is to delay the inevitable: the day is long since past when the hungry of the world can be fobbed off with crumbs from the imperialist table.

No serious disarmament is to be expected; even a greatly stepped-up program of economic assistance to underdeveloped countries can accomplish little. What policies, then, are open to the new administration in its efforts to halt and if possible reverse the disastrous trends of recent years?

So far as we can see, there is only one answer that makes any sense: to negotiate what might be called a "peaceful coexistence" agreement with the Soviet Union. Without attempting to go into details, one can guess that the minimum Russian terms would be along the following lines: (1) recognition of the status quo in Eastern Europe; (2) demilitarization and neutralization of a confederated Germany (West Berlin might

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be made the seat of the United Nations and placed under direct UN sovereignty); (3) admission of Peking to the UN; (4) an end to United States attempts to unseat socialist, pro-socialist, or neutralist governments; (5) the stabilization of trouble spots like the Congo and Laos by restoring to power legitimate governments (Lumumba and Souvanna Phouma) recently overthrown by Western intrigue and intervention; and (6) a ban on further A-bomb testing.

These are not at all stiff or unreasonable terms: except in the case of Germany, inded, they do little more than provide for the United States to accept the actual facts of international life. And it goes without saying that a US-USSR agreement along these lines would relax tensions, reduce the war danger, and greatly improve America's standing in the eyes of the vast majority of the peoples of the world. In this sense, a policy of seeking agreement with the Soviet Union would have excellent prospects of success.

Nevertheless, there are absolutely no signs that Kennedy himself or any of his aides and advisers have ever for one moment contemplated embarking on any such course. Some people, remembering that FDR preached a balanced budget in the 1932 presidential campaign, may believe in the possibility of an about-face after the new team takes over in Washington. We are not among them, and not because we have any preconceived notions about the impossibility or improbability of political about-faces. The truth is that there are very good reasons why no United States government, committed to the defense of capitalism as this, or any possible one in the near future must be, can be expected to seek an agreement for peaceful coexistence with the USSR.

We pass over the purely domestic political obstacle which has been built up by years of hysterical anti-Communism. This would certainly make any early action difficult if not impossible. But anti-Communism was largely "made in Washington," and a government with sufficient determination could in time reshape public opinion in a more reasonable mold. The question is whether such determination is likely to emerge, and to this we can only answer in the negative. The reason, basically, is that a coexistence agreement with the Soviet Union would not check

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the glacial drift of the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America out of the "free world" and into neutralism, and out of neutralism and into the socialist bloc. On the contrary, such an agreement would in all likelihood speed up these shift-overs, for the simple reason that it would discourage the defenders of the old order in the underdeveloped countries, weaken their will and ability to resist progressive change, and in some cases induce the more intelligent (or opportunistic) among them to desert the sinking ship or even join the revolution. In the long run, to be sure, the United States cannot prevent the underdeveloped world from going socialist. But it can, and almost certainly will, fight against it as long as possible and by any and every means at its disposal. And that inevitably precludes any but partial, local, and in all probability temporary agreements with the Soviet Union.

It might be urged that it should be American policy to seek more than mere peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union, that the two countries should also agree to cooperate in stabilizing the world either along present lines or in accordance with a negotiated division of countries and regions among the capitalist, neutralist, and socialist blocs. It is doubtful if such an agreement could ever have been carried out, though it is quite possible that Stalin would have been willing to give it a try. But whatever may have been the case ten or fifteen years ago, it is quite certain that Khrushchev could not deliver "stabilization" today even if he wanted to; and if he were so foolish as to try, the moral and intellectual leadership of the world revolutionary movement would rapidly pass from Moscow to Peking. Khrushchev, we conclude, would have somewhat less than no interest in trying.

In this connection, we should beware of the historical analogy with the 1920's when a *de facto* stabilization between the capitalist and socialist worlds actually existed for a number of years. That was possible because by 1924 a real equilibrium of forces had been reached. The attempts of the entente powers to "strangle the Bolshevik Revolution in its cradle" had failed, in no small part because of the anti-interventionist attitude of the Western European workers. On the other hand, after the failure of the October, 1923, uprising in Hamburg, the danger

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of socialist expansion all but disappeared (the underdeveloped countries had as yet hardly begun to stir). The Soviet Union could not be crushed, but it was much too weak and preoccupied with internal problems to constitute a threat to imperialist interests. Under the circumstances, both sides agreed to live and let live, a concrete situation which found its theoretical expression in Lenin's doctrine of peaceful coexistence.

Today conditions are completely different, and the meaning of peaceful coexistence has also changed. Whereas in 1924 it meant acceptance by both sides of a temporarily stable division of the world, now it means acceptance by both sides of an inherently changing division—and the changes are all against capitalism and in favor of socialism. The Soviet Union is willing, of course. That explains its repeated disarmament initiatives—and gives us every reason to believe that they are both serious and sincere. But the United States, leader and mainstay of world capitalism, has—quite naturally, it should be said—taken the opposite attitude. It did so under Truman and Eisenhower (and almost certainly would have under Roosevelt if he had lived), and there is no reason to assume that it will be any different under Kennedy.

This doesn't mean that there will be *no* changes in American foreign policy. Messrs. Kennedy, Rusk, Bowles, Stevenson et al are undoubtedly a good deal smarter than the likes of Eisenhower, Dulles, and Herter. They can be expected to conduct the anti-socialist struggle more intelligently, more persuasively, more demagogically. They will avoid blunders like Dulles's statement about Goa at the very moment when he was wooing India, or abstaining from voting on a UN resolution against colonialism while trying to win the allegiance of the new African nations; they may well refrain from trying to fight where the odds are hopelessly against them, as in Laos; they may comprehend, and act on the knowledge, that a ban on A-bomb tests is as much in the interests of the United States as of the Soviet Union. But they are most *unlikely* to contemplate, let alone carry out, any basic changes in the direction or goals of American foreign policy. What is apparently in the cards is a more skillful, more intelligent, more expert pursuit of the same old ends—better chauffeurs driving better cars along the same

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bumpy highway to the same destination.

We intend no prejudgment of the longer-run future. Sooner or later great crises are certain, and it is crises that pose genuine historical alternatives. They may be such as virtually to impose retreat and change of course on the American ruling class and its government of the moment. They may bring the people into action again, as the Great Depression of 1929-1933 did. The past determines the future only within broad limits; in between there is room for all sorts of variations and surprises.

There is thus no ground for a fatalistic or defeatist attitude as we enter the Kennedy era. But neither is there any reason to entertain illusions. The plain fact is that no new New Deal is in sight in either domestic or foreign affairs.

(January 13, 1961)

THE MORAL UN-NEUTRALITY OF SCIENCE

BY C. P. SNOW

The following is the full text of the address delivered to the American Association for the Advancement of Science in New York on December 27, 1960, by C. P. Snow, famous British scientist and novelist. We print it in MR because much of what it says is equally relevant to the social sciences; because we have not seen the entire text published anywhere else; and because we want every MR reader to have it and to use it. We know of no document which is better calculated to arouse not only scientists but all citizens to a sense of the dangers and responsibilities—and also the potentialities—which confront all of us at this crucial juncture of world history.—The Editors

Scientists are the most important occupational group in the world today. At this moment, what they do is of passionate concern to the whole of human society. At this moment, the scientists have little influence on the world effect of what they

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do. Yet potentially, they can have great influence. The rest of the world is frightened both of what they do—that is, of the intellectual discoveries of science—and of its effect. The rest of the world, transferring its fears, is frightened of the scientists themselves, and tends to think of them as radically different from other men.

As an ex-scientist, if I may call myself so, I know that is nonsense. I have even tried to express in fiction some kinds of scientific temperament and scientific experience. I know well enough that scientists are very much like other men. After all, we are all human, even if some of us don't give that appearance. I think I would be prepared to risk a generalization. The scientists I have known, and because of my official life I have known as many as anyone in the world, have been in certain respects just perceptibly more morally admirable than most other groups of intelligent men.

That is a sweeping statement, and I mean it only in a statistical sense. But I think there is just a little in it. The moral qualities I admire in scientists are quite simple ones, but I am very suspicious of attempts to oversubtilize moral qualities. It is nearly always a sign, not of true sophistication, but of a specific kind of triviality. So I admire in scientists very simple virtues, like courage, truth-telling, kindness—in which, judged by the low standards which the rest of us manage to achieve, the scientists are not deficient. I think on the whole the scientists make slightly better husbands and fathers than most of us, and I admire them for it. I don't know the figures, and I should be curious to have them sorted out, but I am prepared to bet that the proportion of divorces among scientists is slightly but significantly less than that among other groups of similar education and income. I do not apologize for considering that a good thing.

A close friend of mine is a very distinguished scientist. He is also one of the few scientists I know who has lived what we used to call a Bohemian life. When we were both younger, he thought he would undertake historical research to see how many great scientists had been as fond of women as he was. I think he would have felt mildly supported if he could have found a precedent. I remember his reporting to me that his researches

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hadn't had any luck. The really great scientists seemed to vary from a few neutral characters to a large number who were depressingly "normal." The only gleam of comfort was to be found in the life of Jerome Cardan; and Cardan wasn't anything like enough to outweigh all the others.

So scientists are not much different from other men. They are certainly no worse than other men. But they do differ from other men in one thing. That is the point I started with. Whether they like it or not, what they do is of critical importance for the human race. Intellectually, it has transformed the climate of our time. Socially, it will decide whether we live or die, and how we live or die. It holds decisive powers for good and evil. *That* is the situation in which the scientists find themselves. They may not have asked for it, or only have asked for it in part, but they cannot escape it. They think, many of the more sensitive of them, that they don't deserve to have this weight of responsibility heaved upon them. All they want to do is to get on with their work. I sympathize. But the scientists can't escape the responsibility—any more than they, or the rest of us, can escape the gravity of the moment in which we stand.

There is of course one way to contract out. It has been a favorite way for intellectual persons caught in the midst of water too rough for them.

It consists of the invention of categories—or, if you like, of the division of moral labor. That is, the scientists who want to contract out say *we* produce the tools. *We* stop there. It is for *you,* the rest of the world, the politicians, to say how the tools are used. The tools may be used for purposes which most of us would regard as bad. If so, we are sorry. But as scientists, that is no concern of ours.

This is the doctrine of the ethical neutrality of science. I can't accept it for an instant. I don't believe any scientist of serious feeling can accept it. It is hard, some think, to find the precise statements which will prove it wrong. Yet we nearly all feel intuitively that the invention of comfortable categories is a moral trap. It is one of the easier methods of letting the conscience rust. It is exactly what the early 19th-century economists, such as Ricardo, did in the face of the facts of the first industrial revolution. We wonder now how men, intelligent men,

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can have been so morally blind. We realize how the exposure of that moral blindness gave Marxism its apocalyptic force. We are now, in the middle of the scientific or second industrial revolution, in something like the same position as Ricardo. Are we going to let our consciences rust? Can we ignore that intimation we nearly all have, that scientists have a unique responsibility? Can we believe it, that science is morally neutral?

To me—it would be dishonest to pretend otherwise—there is only one answer to those questions. Yet I have been brought up in the presence of the same intellectual categories as most western scientists. It would also be dishonest to pretend that I find it easy to construct a rationale which expresses what I now believe. The best I can hope for is to fire a few sighting shots. Perhaps someone who sees more clearly than I can will come along and make a real job of it.

Let me begin by a remark which seems some way off the point. Anyone who has ever done any science knows how much aesthetic joy he has obtained. That is, in the actual *activity* of science, in the process of making a discovery, however humble it is, one can't help feeling an awareness of beauty. The subjective experience, the aesthetic satisfaction, seems exactly the same as the satisfaction one gets from writing a poem or a novel, or composing a piece of music. I don't think anyone has succeeded in distinguishing between them. The literature of scientific discovery is full of this aesthetic joy. The very best communication of it that I know comes in G. H. Hardy's book, *A Mathematician's Apology*. Graham Greene once said he thought that, along with Henry James's prefaces, this was the best account of the artistic experience ever written. But one meets the same thing all over the history of science. Bolyai's great yell of triumph when he saw he could construct a self-consistent, non-Euclidean geometry; Rutherford's revelation to his colleagues that he knew what the atom was like; Darwin's slow, patient, timorous certainty that at last he had got there: all these are voices, different voices, of aesthetic ecstasy.

That is not the end of it. The *result* of the activity of science, the actual finished piece of scientific work, has an aesthetic value in itself. The judgments passed on it by other scientists will more often than not be expressed in aesthetic terms: "That's

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beautiful!" or "That really is very pretty!" (as the understating English tend to say). The aesthetics of scientific constructs, like the aesthetics of works of art, are variegated. We think some of the great syntheses, like Newton's, beautiful because of their classical simplicity; but we see a different kind of beauty in the relativistic extension of the wave-equation, or the interpretation of the structure of D.N.A., perhaps because of the touch of unexpectedness. Scientists know their kinds of beauty when they see them. They are suspicious, and scientific history shows they have always been right to have been so, when a subject is in an "ugly" state. For example, most physicists would feel in their bones that the present bizarre assembly of nuclear particles, as grotesque as a stamp-collection, can't possibly be, in the long run, the last word.

We should not restrict the aesthetic values to what we call "pure" science. Applied science has its beauties, which are, in my view, identical in nature. The magnetron has been a marvelously useful device; but it was a beautiful device, not exactly apart from its utility, but because it did, with such supreme economy, precisely what it was designed to do. Right down in the field of development, the aesthetic experience is as real to engineers. When they forget it, when they begin to design heavy-power equipment about twice as heavy as it needs to be, engineers are the first to know that they are lacking virtue.

There is no doubt, then, about the aesthetic content of science, both in the activity and the result. But aesthetics has no connection with morals, say the categorizers. I don't want to waste time on peripheral issues—but are you quite sure of that? Or is it possible that these categories are inventions to make us evade the human and social conditions in which we now exist? But let us move straight on to something else, which is right in the grain of the activity of science, and which is at the same time quintessentially moral. I mean, the desire to find the truth.

By truth, I don't intend anything complicated, once again. I am using the word as a scientist uses it. We all know that the philosophical examination of the concept of empirical truth gets us into some curious complexities; but most scientists really don't care. They know that the truth, as they use the word, and as the rest of us use it in the language of common speech, is what makes

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science work. That is good enough for them. On it rests the whole great edifice of modern science. They have a sneaking sympathy for Rutherford, who, when asked to examine the philosophical bases of science, was inclined to reply, as he did to the metaphysician Samuel Alexander: "Well, what have you been talking all your life, Alexander? Just hot air! Nothing but hot air!"

Anyway, truth in their own straightforward sense is what the scientists are trying to find. They want to find what is *there*. Without that desire, there is no science. It is the driving force of the whole activity. It compels the scientist to have an overriding respect for truth, every stretch of the way. That is, if you're going to find what is *there*, you mustn't deceive yourself or anyone else. You mustn't lie to yourself. At the crudest level, you mustn't fake your experiments.

Curiously enough, scientists do try to behave like that. A short time ago, I wrote a novel in which the story hinged on a case of scientific fraud. But I made one of my characters, who was himself a very good scientist, say that, considering the opportunities and temptation, it is astonishing how few such cases there are. We have all heard of perhaps half a dozen open and notorious ones, which are on the record for anyone to read—ranging from the "discovery" of the L-Radiation to the singular episode of the Piltdown Man.

We have all, if we have lived any time in the scientific world, heard private talk of something like another dozen cases which for various reasons are not yet public property. In some of these cases, we know the motives for the cheating. Sometimes but not always, sheer personal advantage, such as getting money or a job. But not always. A special kind of vanity has led more than one man into scientific faking. At a lower level of research, there are presumably some more cases. There must have been occasional Ph.D. students who scraped by with the help of a bit of fraud.

But the total number of all these men is vanishingly small by the side of the total number of scientists. Incidentally, the effect on science of such frauds is also vanishingly small. Science is a self-correcting system. That is, no fraud (or honest mistake) is going to stay undetected for long. There is no need for an

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extrinsic scientific criticism, because criticism is inherent in the process itself. So that all that a fraud can do is waste the time of the scientists who have to clear it up.

The remarkable thing is not the handful of scientists who deviate from the search for truth, but the overwhelming numbers who keep to it. That is a demonstration, absolutely clear for anyone to see, of moral behavior on a very large scale.

We take it for granted. Yet it is very important. It differentiates science in its widest sense (which includes scholarship) from all other intellectual activities. There is a built-in moral component right in the core of the scientific activity itself. The desire to find the truth is itself a moral impulse, or at least contains a moral impulse. The way in which a scientist tries to find the truth imposes on him a constant moral discipline. We say a scientific conclusion—such as the contradiction of parity by Lee and Yang—is "true" in the limited sense of scientific truth, just as we say that it is "beautiful," according to the criteria of scientific aesthetics. We also know that to reach this conclusion took a set of actions which would have been useless without the moral nature. That is, all through the marvelous experiments of Dr. Wu and her colleagues, there was the constant moral exercise of seeking and telling the truth. To scientists, who are brought up in this climate, this seems as natural as breathing. Yet it is a wonderful thing. Even if the scientific activity contained only this one moral component, that alone would be enough to let us say that it was morally un-neutral.

But is this the only moral component? All scientists would agree about the beauty and the truth. In the western world, they wouldn't agree on much more. Some will feel with me, in what I am going to say. Some will not. That doesn't affect me much, except that I am worried by the growth of an attitude I think very dangerous, a kind of technological conformity disguised as cynicism. I shall say a little more about that later. As for disagreement, G. H. Hardy used to comment that a serious man ought not to waste his time stating a majority opinion—there are plenty of others to do that. That was the voice of classical scientific nonconformity. I wish that we heard it more often.

Let me collect some grounds for hope. Any of us who

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were doing science before 1933 can remember what the atmosphere was like. It is a terrible bore when aging men in their fifties speak about the charms of their youth. Yet I am going to irritate you—just as Talleyrand irritated his juniors—by saying that unless one was on the scene before 1933, one hasn't known the sweetness of the scientific life. The scientific world of the twenties was as near a full-fledged international community as we are likely to get. Don't think I'm saying that the men involved were superhuman or free from the ordinary frailties. That wouldn't come well from me, who have spent a fraction of my writing life pointing out that scientists are, first and foremost, men. But the atmosphere of the scientific twenties was filled with an air of benevolence and magnanimity, which transcended the people who lived in it.

Anyone who ever spent a week in Cambridge or Gottingen or Copenhagen felt it all round him. Rutherford had very human faults, but he was a great man with abounding human generosity. For him the world of science was a world that lived on a plane above the nation-state, and lived there with joy. That was at least as true of those two other great men, Niels Bohr and Franck—and some of that spirit rubbed off on to the pupils round them. The same was true of the Roman school of physics.

The personal links within this international world were very close. It is worth remembering that Peter Kapitza, who was a loyal Soviet citizen, honored my country by working in Rutherford's laboratory for many years. He became a Fellow of the Royal Society, a Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, and the founder and king-pin of the best physics club Cambridge has known. He never gave up his Soviet citizenship, and is now director of the Institute of Physical Problems in Moscow. Through him a generation of English scientists came to have personal knowledge of their Russian colleagues. These exchanges were then, and have remained, more valuable than all the diplomatic exchanges ever invented.

The Kapitza phenomenon couldn't take place now. I hope to live to see the day when a young Kapitza can once more work for sixteen years in Berkeley or Cambridge, and then go back to an eminent place in his own country. When that can happen,

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we are all right. But after the idyllic years of world science, we passed into a tempest of history; and, by an unfortunate coincidence, we passed into a technological tempest too.

The discovery of atomic fission broke up the world of international physics. "This has killed a beautiful subject," said Mark Oliphant, the father-figure of Australian physics, in 1945, after the bombs had dropped. In intellectual terms, he has not turned out right. In spiritual and moral terms, I sometimes think he has.

A good deal of the international community of science remains in other fields—in great areas of biology, for example. Many biologists are feeling the same liberation, the same joy at taking part in a magnanimous enterprise, as physicists felt in the twenties. More than likely, the moral and intellectual leadership of science will pass to biologists, and it is among them we shall find the Rutherfords, Bohrs, and Francks of the next generation.

Physicists have had a bitterer task. With the discovery of fission, and with some technical breakthroughs in electronics, physicists became, almost overnight, the most important military resource a nation-state could call on. A large number of physicists became soldiers not in uniform. So they have remained, in the advanced societies, ever since.

It is very difficult to see what else they could have done. All this began in the Hitler War. Most scientists thought then that Nazism was as near absolute evil as a human society can manage. I myself thought so. I still think so, without qualification. That being so, Nazism had to be fought, and since the Nazis might make fission bombs—which we thought possible until 1944, and which was a continual nightmare if one was remotely in the know—well then, we had to make them too. Unless one was an unlimited pacifist, there was nothing else to do. An unlimited pacificism is a position which most of us cannot sustain.

Therefore I respect, and to a large extent share, the moral attitudes of those scientists who devoted themselves to making the bomb. But the trouble is, when you get on to any kind of moral escalator, to know whether you're ever going to be able to get off. When scientists became soldiers, they gave up some-

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thing, so imperceptibly that they didn't realize it, of the full scientific life. Not intellectually. I see no evidence that scientific work on weapons of maximum destruction has been in any intellectual respect different from other scientific work. But there is a moral difference.

It may be—scientists who are better men than I am often take this attitude, and I have tried to represent it faithfully in one of my books—that this is a moral price which, in certain circumstances, has to be paid. Nevertheless, it is no good pretending that there is not a moral price. Soldiers have to obey. That is the foundation of their morality. It is not the foundation of the scientific morality. Scientists have to question and if necessary to rebel. I don't want to be misunderstood. I am no anarchist. I am not suggesting that loyalty is not a prime virtue. I am not saying that all rebellion is good. But I am saying that loyalty can easily turn into conformity, and that conformity can often be a cloak for the timid and self-seeking. So can obedience, carried to the limit. When you think of the long and gloomy history of man, you will find far more, and far more hideous crimes have been committed in the name of obedience than have ever been committed in the name of rebellion. If you doubt that, read William Shirer's *Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*. The German officer corps were brought up in the most rigorous code of obedience. To themselves, no more honorable and God-fearing body of men could conceivably exist. Yet in the name of obedience, they were party to, and assisted in, the most wicked large-scale actions in the history of the world.

Scientists must not go that way. Yet the duty to question is not much of a support when you are living in the middle of an organized society. I speak with feeling here. I was an official for twenty years. I went into official life at the beginning of the war, for the reasons my scientific friends began to make weapons. I stayed in that life until a year ago, for the same reason that made my scientific friends turn into civilian soldiers. The official life in England is not quite so disciplined as a soldier's, but it is very nearly so. I think I know the virtues, which are very great, of the men who live that disciplined life. I also know what for me was the moral trap. I too, had got on to an escalator. I can put the result in a sentence: I was coming to hide be-

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hind the institution; I was losing the power to say no.

Only a very bold man, when he is a member of an organized society, can keep the power to say no. I tell you that, not being a very bold man, or one who finds it congenial to stand alone, away from his colleagues. We can't expect many scientists to do it. Is there any tougher ground for them to stand on? I suggest to you that there is. I believe that there is a spring of moral action in the scientific activity which is at least as strong as the search for truth. The name of this spring is *knowledge*. Scientists *know* certain things in a fashion more immediate and more certain than those who don't comprehend what science is. Unless we are abnormally weak or abnormally wicked men, this knowledge is bound to shape our actions. Most of us are timid; but to an extent, knowledge gives us guts. Perhaps it can give us guts strong enough for the jobs in hand.

I had better take the most obvious example. All physical scientists *know* that it is relatively easy to make plutonium. We know this, not as a journalistic fact at second hand, but as a fact in our own experience. We can work out the number of scientific and engineering personnel needed for a nation-state to equip itself with fission and fusion bombs. We *know* that for a dozen or more states, it will only take perhaps six years, perhaps less. Even the best-informed of us always exaggerate these periods.

This we know, with the certainty of—what shall I call it?—engineering truth. We also most of us are familiar with statistics and the nature of odds. We know, with the certainty of statistical truth, that if enough of these weapons are made—by enough different states—some of them are going to blow up. Through accident, or folly, or madness—but the motives don't matter. What does matter is the nature of the statistical fact.

All this we *know*. We know it in a more direct sense than any politician because it comes from our direct experience. It is part of our minds. Are we going to let it happen?

All this we *know*. It throws upon scientists a direct and personal responsibility. It is not enough to say that scientists have a responsibility as citizens. They have a much greater one than that, and one different in kind. For scientists have a moral imperative to say what they know. It is going to make them un-

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popular in their own nation-states. It may do worse than make them unpopular. That doesn't matter. Or at least, it does matter to you and me, but it must not count in the face of the risks.

For we genuinely know the risks. We are faced with an Either-Or, and we haven't much time. Either we accept a restriction of nuclear armaments. This is going to begin, just as a token, with an agreement on the stopping of nuclear tests. The United States is not going to get the 99.9 percent "security" that it has been asking for. It is unobtainable, though there are other bargains that the United States could probably secure. I am not going to conceal from you that this course involves certain risks. They are quite obvious, and no honest man is going to blink them. That is the *Either*. The *Or* is not a risk but a certainty. It is this. There is no agreement on tests. The nuclear arms race between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. not only continues, but accelerates. Other countries join in. Within, at the most, six years, China and several other states have a stock of nuclear bombs. Within, at the most, ten years, some of those bombs are going off. I am saying this as responsibly as I can. *That* is the certainty. On the one side, therefore, we have a finite risk. On the other side we have a certainty of disaster. Between a risk and a certainty, a sane man does not hesitate.

It is the plain duty of scientists to explain this Either-Or. It is a duty which seems to me to come from the moral nature of the scientific activity itself.

The same duty, though in a much more pleasant form, arises about the benevolent powers of science. For scientists know, and again with the certainty of scientific knowledge, that we possess every scientific fact we need to transform the physical life of half the world. And transform it within the span of people now living. I mean, we have all the resources to help half the world live as long as we do, and eat enough. All that is missing is the will. We *know* that. Just as we know that you in this country, and to a slightly less extent we in ours, have been almost unimaginably lucky. We are sitting like people in a smart and cozy restaurant, and we are eating comfortably, looking out of the window into the streets. Down on the pavement are people who are looking up at us, people who by chance have different colored skins from ours, and are rather hungry. Do you

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wonder that they don't like us all that much? Do you wonder that we sometimes feel ashamed of ourselves, as we look out through that plate glass?

Well, it is within our power to get started on that problem. We are morally impelled to. We all know that, if the human species does solve that one, there will be consequences which are themselves problems. For instance, the population of the world will become embarrassingly large. But that is another challenge. There are going to be challenges to our intelligence and to our moral nature as long as man remains man. After all, a challenge is not, as the word is coming to be used, an excuse for slinking off and doing nothing. A challenge is something to be picked up.

For all these reasons, I believe the world community of scientists has a final responsibility upon it—a greater responsibility than is pressing on any other body of men. I do not pretend to know how they will bear this responsibility. These may be famous last words, but I have an inextinguishable hope. For, as I have said tonight, there is no doubt that the scientific activity is both beautiful and truthful. I cannot prove it, but I believe that, simply because scientists cannot escape their own knowledge, they also won't be able to avoid showing themselves disposed to good.

Courage is steadfastness not only against danger, but against the temptations of ambition, of ease, of applause, of popularity, of promotions, of wealth, and of power. It is proof against the bribery of a private interest. For such courage there was never greater need than today in our own country, where conformity is creeping in to steal the place of independence in our national morality and poverty is regarded as a disgrace. . . .

Courage is the armament of the spirit. It has something of the antique military in it, even though worn by a civilian. It enables a man to live his life as a stoic discipline, making demands on himself, "to live coarsely, dress plainly, and lie hard," as Emerson put it. With it he can laugh at the nonsense propounded by the potentates and hold fast to his own opinions through time, pleasures, pains, and doubts.

—J. P. Morray, Pride of State

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REFLECTIONS ON THE CUBAN REVOLUTION

BY PAUL A. BARAN

VI

No mention has been made thus far of the urban workers. Indeed, the role played by them in fighting and winning the revolutionary battles was small. It would seem that the employed segment of the industrial working class remained on the whole passive throughout the revolutionary period. Forming the "aristocratic" layer of the Cuban proletariat, these workers partook of the profits of monopolistic business—foreign and domestic—were well paid by Latin American standards, and enjoyed a standard of living considerably higher than that of the masses of the Cuban people. The fairly strong trade union movement was dominated by "business unionism" United States style, and was thoroughly permeated by racketeering and gangsterism. The Communist Party, although influential among the rank and file, was numerically weak, outlawed, and subjected to persecution, terror, and assassinations on the part of Batista's police and Batista's strongmen in the trade union organizations. The CP's policy was therefore extremely cautious. Anxious not to expose its meager cadres to physical annihilation, the party was reluctant to engage in overt actions and confined itself for the most part to political education and direct trade union activity. Anchored primarily in the urban working class and having few roots in the countryside, it took almost no part in Castro's campesino movement; only a handful of Communist Party members joined the rebels in the Sierra Maestra.

This "wait and see" attitude of the working class towards the 26th of July Movement continued during the first months after the Revolution. It was not until the revolutionary govern-

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ment embarked upon nationalization of industrial enterprises that industrial workers began giving really active support to the Revolution, began to realize its socialist character. Since then, as the Revolution moved ever more pronouncedly beyond its original political objectives, and towards the realization of a socialist society in Cuba, the labor movement has identified itself to an ever increasing extent with Fidel Castro. To be sure, the trade unions reproduced on a smaller scale the tensions and differentiations besetting the nation as a whole. Some right-wing labor leaders who at first joined the Revolution have since defected, just as have middle class politicians for whom the Revolution was "going too far." On the other side, "ultra-left" labor politicians have been grumbling about insufficient benefits accruing to labor at the present time, and, imbued by an old syndicalist tradition, have threatened or even organized strikes against government-owned enterprises.

The situation was somewhat different in what might be called the *déclassé* part of the working class: the unemployed in the cities and the large number of those more or less steadily engaged in service trades, the tourist industry, and the economy's distributive sector. In these groups there was apparently a considerable amount of sympathy for the 26th of July Movement, which, however, was more akin to the sentiments of the middle class than to the enthusiasm for the Revolution on the part of the campesinos. Finding no organized expression, it contributed nevertheless to the spread of the general atmosphere favorable to the revolutionary movement, thus facilitating the activities of its underground network and broadening Castro's popular base on the day after the Revolution.

VII

And so it came about that Cuba's Great Revolution followed the pattern of a "permanent revolution," passing rapidly from one stage of revolutionary struggle to the next, compressing more than a century of historical development into the narrow span of less than a year, and solving within weeks problems which elsewhere and earlier have occupied entire decades. Having started as a national, anti-imperialist, political revolution it had immediately to cope with the desperate animosity and bitter

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resistance of American imperialism, and was thus forced within a few months to enter the next phase and to turn into a social revolution. And the social revolution, by its very nature, could not but begin immediately to assume a proletarian, socialist character. Propelled by rural workers and led by a political group deriving its inspirations and its program from the economic and social conditions of the campesinos, the Revolution instead of parcelling out land and thus creating *more* private property in the means of production—the characteristic and essential feature of a bourgeois revolution—organized at the outset producers' cooperatives in agriculture and thus drastically *reduced* the sphere of private property in the countryside. Carrying out the universally approved mandate to destroy Batista's tyranny, it confiscated the property of the most notorious and most offensive members of the Batista gang, and thus broke the back of the narrow but powerfully entrenched comprador stratum of the Cuban bourgeoisie.

And yet, even with the help of hindsight, it cannot be safely assumed that the Revolution would have run its full course toward the abolition of private property in all the important means of production, if it had not been for the powerful catalyst provided by the hostility and intransigence of the United States. In spite of a hatred of imperialism shared by almost the entire nation, it was not until the refusal by American-owned oil companies to process Soviet oil that the properties of those companies were first "intervened" and then nationalized. Nor was it before the unilateral abrogation of the Cuban sugar quota by the American government, that further American enterprises were taken over. And it was not until the recent general embargo on most United States exports to Cuba, that the remainder of American business in Cuba was turned into social property. In sum, it was the firm, unwavering reaction to American challenges, the courageous and uncompromising prosecution of the anti-imperialist struggle which ripened, hothouse fashion, the fledgling Cuban Revolution and pushed it in the direction of economic planning and socialism.

All this was not "realization of an idea" or execution of a previously conceived plan. Quite on the contrary, the Revolution groped its way from step to step, moving in response to the chal-

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lenges and necessities of the historical situation, teaching the leadership and the masses the categorical imperatives of its own development, overcoming all obstacles to its progress, and destroying in the process its enemies as well as its false friends, the counter-revolutionaries as well as the traitors and the weaklings. By its experience it confirmed, however, a number of most important tenets of the theory of economic and social development. It demonstrated once more that in the present age all genuine efforts at liberation and economic and social advancement of colonial and dependent countries grow necessarily into political revolutions and that these political revolutions equally necessarily transcend themselves and evolve into social revolutions with a socialist content. It corroborated also the fundamental proposition that in our time all social revolutions are no longer *intra*-national revolutions, the fate of which is decided by the class struggle *within* nations, but turn immediately into *inter*-national revolutions the outcome of which is determined by the class struggle on the international arena, by the relative strength of the world's socialist and imperialist camps.

VIII

The international setting of the Cuban Revolution has had a profound influence on its course. The sharp and undisguised hostility of the American ruling class toward the social transformation in Cuba has accentuated the anti-imperialist character of the Revolution and added to its scope and momentum. At the same time it markedly affected the class struggle within Cuba itself. The dialectic of the process involved is remarkable and deserves careful attention. Having administered a crushing defeat to the Batista-comprador sector of the Cuban ruling class during the winter 1958-1959, the 26th of July Movement took over the government of a nearly united nation. With the campesinos and the industrial workers on its side, with most of the bourgeoisie allied or neutralized, the revolutionary government of Cuba faced practically no opposition. That the honeymoon would not last forever was foreseeable from the very outset. At every step going beyond its political, bourgeois-democratic phase the Revolution necessarily lost some of the bourgeoisie's sympathy and support. And every time a further number of so-called middle-

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of-the-road politicians, intellectuals, and ordinary bourgeois turned their back on Fidel Castro, some of his old friends and comrades-in-arms defected, withdrew into private life, or joined the counter-revolutionaries in Miami and in Guatemala. Such losses of marginal supporters, of vacillating fellow-travellers are inevitable in every revolution that is running its full course. Many leaves fall off before the heart of the artichoke is reached. But what has greatly accelerated and sharpened the process of differentiation and polarization within an all but unanimous people in arms is the incessantly present American influence. For without the prospect (or hope) of an American intervention, the Cuban counter-revolutionaries would not have the slightest chance of success. Completely isolated from the people, out of step with its aspirations, its struggles, and its achievements, these "former people" would have to throw in the sponge, reconcile themselves to living in a new society, or emigrate to more congenial parts. Only the ever-present prospect of American marines descending from Guantánamo or of a contingent made up of American-trained, American-equipped, and American-transported Cubans invading the island from their American-maintained bases in Guatemala and Florida has upheld the spirit of the counter-revolutionaries, has given them reason to bide their time and to look forward to an opportunity to put the clock back, to have an Iran, a Spain, a Guatemala in Cuba.

There can be no doubt that this continual "re-fueling" of the counter-revolutionaries' morale has done much harm to the Cuban Revolution. Without it there would have been no guerillas in the Escambray; without it there would be no need for political repression; without it 200,000 worker and campesino militiamen would not need to spend a good part of their time in armed vigils in the towns and on the beaches of the country; and without it the overworked, overstrained leaders of the Revolution could devote themselves singlemindedly to the burning task of organizing the national economy rather than live in a permanent state of emergency coping all the time with genuine or imaginary threats to national security. To be sure, even the ever-present danger of an American-promoted counter-revolution has been of some advantage to the Cuban Revolution. Although it has led some to abandon or to betray it, it has at the same time cemented

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more firmly than would have been possible otherwise the cohesion, the devotion, and the determination of all the popular, anti-imperialist forces in the country. That the words inscribed on the banner of the Cuban Revolution are not only "Cuba si, Yanqui no" but also "Patria o Muerte" is the contribution of the American ruling class to the cause of Cuban liberation.

The international setting of the Cuban Revolution has also another side to it. It is generally sensed in Cuba, and for this there is much incontrovertible evidence, that in the absence of a powerful bloc of socialist countries, the Cuban Revolution would have been crushed long ago by the forces of imperialism. Indeed, the help provided Cuba by the Soviet Union, by China, and by the socialist countries of Eastern Europe is immeasurable. Politically and morally it assumed vast significance by giving the Cubans the strong sense of not being alone, of reassuring them in their desperate, unequal struggle with the American giant. Economically, it tided them over what would undoubtedly have developed into a fatal crisis. By supplying them with oil, the Soviet Union prevented their remaining suddenly without any kind of fuel. By opening their markets to Cuban sugar, the socialist countries saved Cuba's most important single industry. By granting Cuba credits and shipping to Cuba industrial and agricultural equipment as well as by dispatching to Cuba experts and technicians, they enabled the country to maintain and to begin developing its agricultural and industrial economy.

And this corroborates the crucially important proposition that every new arrival in the socialist camp finds the going easier than the country which preceded it, that the strength of socialism in the world is cumulative, that socialist "dividends" will become more frequent and more ample as the number and the power of the socialist countries increase. Just as the cost of modern industry and technology was paid for during the Industrial Revolution by the lives and health and happiness of generations of English and Indian and Irish workers and peasants, so the sweep of socialism in our time is the fruit of the heroism, endurance, and toil of the Russian workers and peasants in the era of the Five Year Plans.

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IX

The Cuban Revolution was born with a silver spoon in its mouth. The solidarity and dedication of its people, the isolation, political bankruptcy, and moral despicability of its adversaries saved the country the administrative chaos and economic turmoil that might have resulted from a long and destructive civil war. The island is nothing short of a paradisic garden where the fertility of the soil is such that it is almost possible to harvest without sowing. The world-renowned French agronomist René Dumont has estimated that if cultivated as intensively as South China, Cuba could feed 50 million people. Under the reign of American corporations, it provided a miserable livelihood for a small fraction of that number. Many advocates of capitalism, while granting the inhumanity and injustice of the capitalist system, like to boast about its supreme efficiency. Only a little study and reflection is needed to see that this claim has no foundation even in the most advanced capitalist countries. When it comes to Cuba (and other underdeveloped countries), its monstrous absurdity is visible to the naked eye.

What I have termed elsewhere* "potential economic surplus" assumes in Cuba gigantic proportions. Sugar cane grows like a weed, and its output could be easily multiplied at minimal cost above the low level enforced by the limitations of the world market. Vast areas of virgin land ideally suited for agriculture can be taken into cultivation by investment of moderate amounts of capital in bulldozers, tractors, and rural housing. Much of the perennial scourge of the Cuban countryside—mass unemployment during the *tiempo muerte*—can be broken up and eventually abolished by diversifying and staggering crops, by using idle manpower on construction jobs, by developing processing plants for agricultural products and other industries.

In nearly all the other countries that have gone through a socialist revolution and embarked upon a program of rapid economic development, shortage of food has been the principal obstacle to progress. New industrial enterprises could be more or less rapidly established. Some foreign exchange could be found

* *The Political Economy of Growth* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1957) Ch. 2.

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to import indispensable machinery. Existing energy sources could be made to carry heavier loads. Even unskilled manpower could be taught to operate and to service complicated new equipment. When it came to agriculture, however, the situation was quite different. In the absence of unutilized land, increases of agricultural output were hard to come by. Technological improvements are difficult and sometimes impossible to introduce in the framework of subsistence farming and against frequently encountered opposition of superstitious and ignorant peasants. And even when and where small increases of output were achieved against exasperating odds, it often proved impossible to obtain those increments for urban consumption. In the absence of an adequate supply of manufactured consumer goods—itself depending on a measure of industrial development or availability of foreign exchange—the peasants, barely eking out a physiological subsistence minimum, consumed rather than brought to market whatever extra output they were able to produce.

Cuba miraculously escapes this vicious circle. In a short time it can radically increase and diversify its agricultural output. It can not only maintain and, if need be, expand its principal export crops—sugar, tobacco, coffee—but it can readily produce at home the staples which it used to import—rice, corn, cotton, vegetable oils, and animal fats. Becoming thus self-sufficient with regard to food, it can devote the foreign exchange proceeds of its exports to the acquisition of machinery, oil, and those raw materials and consumer goods which it is impossible, or at least at the present time uneconomical, to produce at home. Being produced in large-scale agricultural enterprises and not by a multitude of subsistence farmers, Cuba's agricultural product comes naturally to market and is available for export and for urban consumption and processing. It serves thus directly as a base for a program of industrialization, housing, education, and health.

Enabled in this way to organize an immediate improvement of the wretched living conditions of the masses, the Cuban Revolution is spared the excruciating but ineluctable compulsion that has beset all preceding socialist revolutions: the necessity to force a tightening of people's belts today in order to lay the foundations for a better tomorrow. Conveying to the people right away the benefits of a more rational organization of the social

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economy, giving people now what they crave most—more food, more housing, more schools, and more hospitals—the Cuban revolutionary government can retain more easily than any previous revolutionary regime the loyalty and the support of broad popular masses. It can carry out therefore the most far-reaching transformation ever accomplished in human history—the transition from capitalism to socialism—with a minimum of repression and with a minimum of violence, in an atmosphere of freedom and enthusiastic participation of a resurrected nation.

X

Thus far the government of Fidel Castro has fulfilled its historical mandate and has fully grasped and lived up to its unique opportunity. It has initiated an unprecedented burst of creative activity in agriculture and got under way a vast program of expansion and diversification of agricultural output. It has brilliantly perceived the peculiarities and the necessities of Cuba's road to socialism, and proceeded at an early stage to organize producers' cooperatives and large state farms in the countryside. Sensitive and responsive to the vital needs of the people, it has embarked on a comprehensive campaign of housing construction, slum clearance, and school building. Inspired by and inspiring a tremendous outburst of dormant popular energies, it has put the army, the slum-dwellers, the unemployed on the job of building houses, school cities, farms, roads, and hospitals.

It certainly cannot be said as yet that the Revolution has completed its task, that everything is now under control and that Cuba from now on can advance undisturbed on its way to a better and richer society. Such might have been and still might be the case in the absence of harassment and threat from the United States. As matters stand, however, the situation is most precarious, and the difficulties and dangers confronting the Cuban Revolution are numerous and serious. First and foremost, there is obviously the possibility of direct or indirect military action on the part of the United States. The dilemma faced by the policy makers in Washington is genuine and serious. The Cuban Revolution exercises an irresistible magnetism and constitutes a source of encouragement and hope to all the peoples of Latin America, whose economic, social, and political condition

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is the same as or worse than that prevailing in Cuba before the Revolution. Too much is at stake for American corporations, too important are the interests involved, to tolerate a victory of the Cuban people. And yet simply to use the iron fist and to crush the Cuban Revolution is a very risky course of action at the present time. Not only must the power of the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc be reckoned with but also the intrinsic brittleness of all American alliances and dependencies in the so-called "free world." What is more, who is to say whether the wave of revulsion and hostility against the United States that would inevitably sweep all of Latin America in the event of American aggression against Cuba would not do even more harm to American corporate interests than the survival of the Cuban Revolution? The "compromise" apparently arrived at in Washington seems to be an attempt to strangle the Cuban Revolution economically, combined with a systematic build-up in Guatemala and elsewhere of a Cuban counter-revolutionary force for an eventual invasion of Cuba. I think that the first part of this program—economic sanctions culminating in a *de facto* suppression of all American-Cuban trade—is doomed to failure. No doubt it is causing and will cause in the future many frictions and dislocations in the Cuban economy, but none of these difficulties threatens to be such that it could not be overcome by the Cuban government in cooperation with the socialist bloc. Yet the slimmer the chances of Cuba's succumbing under economic pressures, the larger the danger of an accelerated realization of the second part of the scheme: armed invasion aiming at the establishment of a "free" Cuban administration on Cuban soil and the overthrow of the revolutionary government. It would be idle to speculate on the purely military problems involved; but it is quite certain that what was feasible in Iran and in Guatemala would prove impossible in Cuba. There is neither an army holding effective power and ready at any time to stab in the back the civilian government, nor is there a subdued helpless population forced to accept passively whatever happens around the presidential palace. Two hundred thousand workers and campesinos under arms would turn such an invasion into a civil war, and it hardly needs adding that a repetition of Spain today could easily bring about a global holocaust.

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By comparison with this life-and-death question, all the other problems facing the Cuban government seem to be almost trivial. On the social and political side there is the big open problem of Cuba's future political life, and of the mechanism assuring both a socialist and a democratic evolution of Cuban society. Having successfully smashed the principal pillar of the *ancien régime*—its military establishment—the Revolution has also disposed of the phony parliamentary institutions which for years have been covering up the dictatorship of American capital and its Cuban retainers. There can be no doubt about the wisdom of the Revolutionary Government's refusal to call a parliamentary election at the present time. Such an election would serve not merely to revive what has become a defunct and compromised institution, but also to enable the counter-revolutionary forces to integrate and to organize themselves under the guise of a political party operating *within* the framework of the new, socialist Cuba. Social revolutions are never carried out by elections, and it is to Fidel Castro's everlasting credit that he has escaped the pitfall of "parliamentary cretinism." Equally wise and timely was the decision of the Revolutionary Government to reorganize drastically the judiciary and to substitute judges accepting the revolution for the guardians of the old order.

But while all this is based at the present time on direct democracy in action, on the people's unlimited confidence in and affection for Fidel Castro, the time is not too distant when it will become indispensable to create and develop institutions essential to the normal functioning of a democratic, socialist society. Whether such institutions will be direct popular assemblies of the Swiss cantonal type (which would not be impossible in a country as small as Cuba) or whether they will assume the form of campesinos' and workers' councils resembling the Soviet pattern is immaterial. What is important is that some system of democratic representation and control should evolve in the near future. Nor will it be possible to maintain indefinitely the loose, amorphous constitution of the 26th of July Movement. That will have to crystallize itself into a cohesive, closely knit organization serving as the regularly functioning link between the

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broad masses of the working people and their socialist government.

On the economic side there is the necessity to streamline the government's economic administration and to work out and carry through a well considered plan of economic development. There is the urgent need to recruit and train suitable cadres for industry, agriculture, and the civil service—to replace those who have left the country, as well as to satisfy the economy's new and ever-growing requirements. In conjunction with this there is the huge task of reorganizing the country's system of higher education, of finding a sufficient number of competent instructors to produce a new generation of physicists, chemists, agronomists, engineers, physicians, statisticians, and school teachers. There are the pressing claims of the unemployed and of those who have been losing their livelihood as a result of the disappearance of American tourism and of a vast shift in the country's foreign trade.

But all of these are manageable problems and all of them can be dealt with rationally given peace and given time—in particular if the government is permitted to concentrate on their solution. Given peace and given time! Whether the Cuban people will have the good fortune of getting both or whether they will have to go through an ordeal of a devastating civil war no one, I am afraid, can safely predict. All that can be hoped for is that the American ruling class will be able to avoid the crime and the folly of another Suez, perhaps to be followed by the agonies of another Algeria, and that the heroic workers and campesinos of Cuba will be able to continue their magnificent forward movement guided by the courage, the wisdom, and the genius of Fidel Castro.

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THE VOICE OF CUBA

BY LEO HUBERMAN

It is very bad form for academicians in the United States to take a stand on anything that runs counter to official policy. They generally if and but and look at both sides so long that their seat on the fence becomes permanent. And anyone who, after careful analysis of the evidence, gets off the fence and marches along the path dictated by reason is immediately suspect—"not a sound scholar, you know."

That's what the academic reactionaries and frightened fence-sitters have been saying about the work of C. Wright Mills for years now. Their adverse criticism is based, in part, on their jealousy of his prodigious output, and, in part, on his daring not only to probe into controversial questions but actually to take sides. For Mills, the scientific attitude makes only one demand—that you analyze carefully and honestly all the evidence that bears on the problem. It does *not* require that you refuse to go where the evidence takes you. So he goes. And having come to a conclusion based on valid evidence, Mills considers it his plain duty to tell the truth as he sees it so his readers will take sides with him.

In his latest work, *Listen, Yankee* (McGraw-Hill, cloth $3.95; Ballantine Books, paper, 50c), Mills tells the story of the Cuban Revolution in the form of eight letters in which the views of the Cuban revolutionists are made plain to Yankees who have not been getting the truth in their press. Whether he is more passionate about this subject than about others he has examined, or whether the form dictates it, Mills is much more outspoken, more angry, more hard-hitting than he has ever been before. Nor does he confine his blunt criticism of United States foreign policy to its mistakes in Cuba alone; he condemns that policy as a failure everywhere in the world:

Then you must realize that on the shores of Cuba the whole international posture of the United States of America has again collapsed in utter failure. Cuba is a dramatic specification of the

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general bankruptcy of U.S. policies and lack of policies, as your country fails to confront the hungry nations of the world, and as it confronts in such absurd ways the world initiative of the Soviet bloc. (p. 160)

With his background as a sociologist who had spent much time studying other countries abroad, Mills was well-equipped to make the most of his extensive discussions with the top leaders of the Revolution and of his trips around the island. He learned a great deal about Cuba's history and economics, the revolutionary government's accomplishments, and the attitude of the people. Because of the structure of the book, his breadth of knowledge is not easily apparent, but he succeeds in his aim of presenting "the voice of Cuba" only because the eight letters are filled with facts which dramatize what the voice is saying and give substance to the angry tone. Anyone who has tried to present the truth about the Cuban Revolution to a friend whose information comes only from our press and television, will find the answers to practically all the questions that are usually raised in argument; particularly useful is the discussion of "free elections" in which Mills makes some points which Americans need to learn:

The problem of freedom is an ultimate question. The first thing to be said about it is that *nobody* in the world has really solved it and that nobody is going to solve it once and for all. By its very nature, it is something that goes on. . . .

All over the world political actors and people who have newly come out of political un-freedom of the plainest and most awful sort, out of social sloth and economic slavery and biological misery —all over the world, they are the ones who are searching out various new kinds of freedom. They are perilous roads, but they are also possible roads to freedom; that is one reason they are so perilous.

And that is something you in the United States—as a government and as a people—are *not* doing. Neither your leaders nor your people feel the need of it. They assume they're already there, that they've already got it—this freedom. Rather than that, perhaps, they've already had it. . . .

We don't know that a congress, a two-party state, elections every four years—we don't know that these are the only and the

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indispensable ways to freedom. Nor do you. Nor does anybody else. But to believe that only these *are* freedom is indeed to be an idiot of abstractions, an historical provincial, and an unwarranted pessimist. (pp. 127, 129)

You can see from the above why many of the reviewers have fumed at this book and have done a real hatchet job on it. They don't often review books which offer, as a solution to the problem of changing our foreign policy, "You've got to smash Yankee imperialism from inside the United States." (p. 165). Nor is Mills content with having the letter-writer alone say this—he says it himself, just as forcefully (p. 178), in the chapter entitled "Note To The Reader, II" in which he backs up, in his own words, everything that "the voice of Cuba" has been saying.

In spite of the reviewers who have warned their readers against the book, *Listen, Yankee* is having a phenomenal sale as a paperback; the first edition of 175,000 copies was sold out very quickly, and the book has now sold over a quarter of a million copies. It prompted Mrs. Roosevelt to say in her syndicated column (*New York Post,* December 14, 1960): "What is being built in Cuba is, of course, a socialist economy. But this may be a necessity, and more than likely it must be a necessity in many South and Central American countries." If only as many as one quarter of all the readers of the book would get that message!

Economic freedom involves a transference of the authority required in order to plan and direct certain major economic activities from the agents of property-owners to organs acting on behalf of the nation and responsible to it. In an industrial society it can be achieved in that way, and it can be achieved in no other. Hence, while I am not lacking, I hope, in enthusiasm for further development of the communal side of Socialism, I regard it, in the present juncture, except in so far as it is concerned with education and health, as secondary to the conquest of economic power.
—*R. H. Tawney, We Mean Freedom*

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WORLD EVENTS

By Scott Nearing

Recession Is Deepening

World Events for December sounded an economic warning headed "Recession Is Upon Us" (p. 445). Two months later we are rewording the warning to read: "Recession Is Deepening."

There is nothing novel in this statement. Recession warnings appeared all through 1960 in MONTHLY REVIEW, in the *Economic Notes* published monthly by the Labor Research Association (799 Broadway, New York City), in the monthly economic survey published by the Research Department of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. in Washington. By the autumn of 1960 the recession was being described in bank letters and on the front pages of responsible financial newspapers and magazines.

After living with this documented material for twelve months we took it almost for granted. Traveling through Eastern United States in October, November, and December, 1960, we met many people who were taken by surprise when we talked about another recession and depression in much the same tone that we used in discussing the weather. People asked incredulously, "Do you really believe there will be another depression? What about the built-in stabilizers?" One woman said to us with perfect confidence, "But *of course* stocks will continue to go up!"

So thorough has been the economic brainwashing during the past dozen years that millions are convinced that the United States economy will continue to move into a paradise of unending prosperity. The possibility of a serious reverse trend is dismissed with scorn or anger. "There *can't* be another depression!"

Why should the rank and file of American people hold any other view? Their social studies in high school have given them a distorted picture of their economy, and little they have heard or read elsewhere has taught them anything else. Thus far, during the closing days of 1960 we have not seen in the popular press or heard over the radio one accurate appraisal of current economic trends. For the most part the tendencies are ignored.

By mid-December *U.S. News & World Report* was devot-

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ing pages to "the slump" and its problems. In its news summary of December 19, *U.S. News* wrote: "John F. Kennedy, walking right into the middle of a recession, is to face this situation on January 20: Business will be getting worse, not better. Unemployment will be above 5½ million, and rising. Steel mills will be operating at barely half of capacity. Output of industry will be running roughly 7 percent below a year earlier. Factory orders will be lagging."

These sentences do not suggest economic expansion, nor even mere stagnation. Rather, they point to decline and perhaps disruption.

Wholesale Prices Are Falling

One further comment is necessary to complete this description of the economic crisis into which the United States economy is sinking. Raw material prices are sagging on the world market.

Many underdeveloped countries rely upon the sale of one or more materials such as rubber, tin, or coffee to industrialized nations. These products of mining and farming go to pay for manufactured goods which underdeveloped countries require in order to extend their transportation and communication, build their growing cities, and provide equipment for their expanding industries.

With eager markets and high prices, the raw materials producers make good customers for the manufacturers of the industrialized nations. When prices fall, the underdeveloped nations lose buying power. The consequent reductions in employment and wages mean hard times for underdeveloped economies. With falling incomes, tax collections decline and government incomes are reduced at the moment when demands for relief are made by farmers, workers, and businessmen.

Price inflation during the war of 1914-1918 was followed in the postwar years by a price decline that played havoc with the economies of many underdeveloped countries. The same trends are in evidence today. The prices of rubber, hides, wool, cocoa, wheat, sugar, coffee, and copper are falling sharply. Reuters index of wholesale prices, at the end of 1960, was six percent below the same period of 1959.

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Restoration of West Europe's war-shattered economy; the reindustrialization of Germany, Italy, and Japan; rapid advances in the industrial output of Australia, the Argentine, Brazil, Canada; and the overdeveloped productive apparatus of the United States call for greatly enlarged world markets. Instead of expanding, world markets are contracting, as falling prices of their cash crops cut down the purchasing power of underdeveloped countries.

Unemployment, Retail Prices, and Taxes Are Increasing

Downturns in previous business cycles have meant unemployment and part-time work. Job loss has been offset, in part, by a decline in retail prices and by tax relief. Since the war's end in 1945, however, periods of recession and depression have come and gone with excessive unemployment, with retail prices pegged high or rising, and taxes increasing. The reasons for this new pattern are plain enough.

United States Big Business has the American people firmly in its grip. As producers they receive wages and salaries from jobs owned by Big Business concerns. The first signs of recession lead to part-time work and layoffs, which cut take-home pay and increase partial or total unemployment. United States consumers have been advertised into buying packaged goods in shopping centers at prices fixed nationally by the manufacturers, packagers, and store-chains. Take-home pay has been cut while prices have stayed up.

Big Business, in the guise of bankers and money-lenders, has another stranglehold on the United States public: "Buy today, pay tomorrow." From homes to automobile tires, insurance policies, and vacation trips, the consuming public has bought on time, agreeing to make regular weekly or monthly payments. If take-home pay decreases, payments stop and goods are repossessed by the enterprise which sold them.

Taxes are the third item in this economic trinity threatening the people's livelihood. Taxes have been rising more rapidly than United States productivity. From 1929 to 1959 (two "prosperous" years) Gross National Product increased four-fold, while federal taxes increased ten-fold. Federal taxes are raised chiefly

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from incomes. Increasingly, state taxes are imposed on sales. Local taxes are levied on property and services.

During the "easy money" days since 1946, the United States tax bill has risen. With increased tax collections, governments at all levels have increased their payrolls and built themselves an immense overhead of imperative obligations. Even during the recessions of 1949, 1953, and 1957 taxes went up rather than down. Today the tax load is the chief fixed charge on the United States economy.

Growing unemployment, pegged prices, and an intolerable tax burden will spread havoc through the United States economy as the 1959-1960 recession settles into a depression.

The Unsteady Dollar

One other angle of the depression crisis should be mentioned. In the January *World Events* we discussed the growing threat to dollar stability. One of the gravest factors undermining confidence in the dollar has resulted from deficit spending and borrowing by the Washington government. In June, 1960, when the new budget was under discussion, it was taken for granted that a high level of economic activity would continue until June, 1961, with an estimated budget surplus of at least one billion dollars.

Federal funds are secured largely through taxes on individual incomes and the incomes of corporations. The rise of unemployment and part-time work and the sharp decline in corporate income in the last half of 1960 have wiped out any chance of a surplus in the 1960-1961 budget year. Instead, the probable deficit is now estimated at $5 or $6 billion. Such a deficit will mean further loss of confidence in the soundness of the dollar.

Just Around the Corner

What lies ahead? Polls taken among bankers, manufacturers, advertising and credit men during the past few weeks show a fairly uniform pattern of business opinion.

First quarter of 1961: Declining production, sagging sales, higher unemployment, reduced profits.

Second quarter: More of the same, with the first signs of recovery.

Third quarter: Recovery under way. Increases in production, employment, and profits.

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Fourth quarter: Better times. A return to the prosperity levels of 1959, with prospects that 1962 will see new records set in manufacturing, construction, merchandising, banking, insurance, and other branches of the economy.

Under this formula "the soaring sixties" will find United States economy once more on the up-and-up. Patience with the 1959-1960 recession and forbearance under the burdens of the 1960-1961 depression will be smoothed away and forgotten in the flood of prosperity that they say lies just around the corner of an unhappy 1960 and a tough 1961.

This outlook will bring small comfort to Americans who have been acting on the assumption that full employment is in the offing and that stock prices have nowhere to go except up. Moreover, there are reasons for supposing that the formula errs on the side of optimism.

Business prospects for the next eighteen or twenty-four months, as business leaders see them, are based on the assumption that the business cycle which began with the recession of 1959-1960 will follow a course similar to the cycles starting in 1949, 1953, and 1957. All three business cycles were brief and relatively shallow. In all three, the period from one recovery to the next was about four years.

A glance at the course of United States business cycles during previous peacetime periods shows an average span of about four years. But this average is made up of several short cycles followed by a longer cycle. One of these longer cycles began in 1873, a second in 1892, a third in 1913, with the war of 1914 upsetting the pattern. Historical experience is no mandate, but it does suggest lessons, one of which is the wide variation in the depth and length of United States business cycles.

Students of United States economic history would not be surprised if the recession of 1959-1960 continued through a part or all of 1961, dropping the economic level 12 or even 15 percent below that of mid-1959. Should such a deep two-year recession occur, the subsequent depression might easily extend through another two or three years, with revival delayed until 1963, 1964, or perhaps even later.

A deep and long-continued crisis of this type would correspond with similar experiences in the 19th century. It would also

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parallel the recession of 1929-1932 and the depression which extended to the mid-1930's.

Necessarily such a course would be influenced by a minor war and profoundly deflected by a general war in which the United States would participate. It would be even more drastically modified should any important segment of the American people rise in revolt against an economic pattern which makes the rich even richer while it condemns millions to the hardships and injustices of poverty and unemployment.

Belgian Imperialists Stay in the Congo

Debate on the Congo ended in a deadlock in the United Nations Assembly session of December 20, 1960. The assembly rejected two resolutions, one sponsored by India, Yugoslavia, and six Asian and African states; the other sponsored by the United States and Great Britain. The rejection of both resolutions leaves Congolese affairs about where they were until the General Assembly reconvenes on March 7, 1961. The deposed Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba remains a political prisoner of Congo's army leader, Joseph D. Mobutu. The United Nations emergency force of 20,000 men remains in the Congo. Belgian personnel continue to direct affairs in the mineral-rich Katanga state and to advise the Congolese government. In their continued occupation of the Congo, the Belgians and their British and United States co-conspirators are trebly protected: (1) by the Katanga government; (2) by the Congo government of President Joseph Kasavubu, and (3) by the United Nations armed forces in the Congo.

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TWO REVIEWS OF CUBA: ANATOMY OF A REVOLUTION

Since *Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution* was published in its entirety as an issue of MONTHLY REVIEW, it seemed unnecessary to review the book in these pages. However, we think that two reviews which have appeared elsewhere are of sufficient interest to MR readers to warrant their publication here, not so much for what they say about the book as for the light they throw on other matters.

The first is by Herbert Matthews, an editor of the *New York Times;* it appeared in the November, 1960, issue of *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.* As you read this review by the leading Latin American expert of the country's leading newspaper, you may be led to wonder why at least 99 percent of the commercial press of this country has failed to review *Cuba.* By paying us the compliment of treating it as a serious work on one of the great issues of the day, Mr. Matthews has, we think, passed a devastating judgment on the seriousness of the American press as a channel for providing the American people with the information and knowledge they need to form intelligent opinions about an increasingly complex world.

The second piece published below is a somewhat abridged review from the Rio de Janeiro paper *Ultima Hora,* of November 18, 1960. It was translated and sent to us by one of our Brazilian subscribers who comments in an accompanying letter as follows: "Your book came out here two weeks ago [early November] and seems to be causing quite a sensation. I am enclosing a review of it which appeared in the *Ultima Hora,* a newspaper which has always supported the views of the Brazilian Labor Party, which was one of the losing parties in the recent election here. The reviewer, Adalgisa Nery, is a poet and teacher, and writes many articles on nationalist lines. I thought the review interesting, not so much because the writer praises your book, but because of the comparison she makes between conditions in pre-revolutionary Cuba and Brazil at present. This is a comment very frequently heard here." Need we add that similar causes normally produce similar effects?—The Editors

BY HERBERT L. MATTHEWS

Messieurs Huberman and Sweezy have written an interesting book which deserves serious consideration. It is the only extended study yet made of the Cuban Revolution as a revolution, and it is done by two professionals—left-wing socialists who apply the "scientific" measuring rods of their own brand of Marxism.

To say this is to indicate the limitations of the book. It is heavily biased in favor of the Revolution, which is seen with starry-eyed vision through rose-colored glasses. "One of the most

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original and important social transformations of our time . . . a development of enormous historical interest and importance . . . one of the great historic and prophetic events of our time"—so we are told.

This may be so, but the authors themselves concede at the beginning that it is too early to pass judgment. Of one thing they are certain. "For our part we have no hesitation in answering: *the new Cuba is a socialist Cuba.* . . . This is the first time—ever, anywhere—that a genuine socialist revolution has been made by *non-Communists.*"

Considering that the authors only spent three weeks in Cuba last March to get firsthand information for their book, they have done a surprisingly good job of description and analysis. There are a lot of facts, and they are used with understanding. This is where their Marxist technique serves a purpose.

"A revolution," as they truly say, "is a process, not an event." Their interpretation of the reason for the poor news coverage of the revolution in the United States is that "bourgeois reportage and scholarship . . . are constitutionally incapable of understanding historical phenomena in their development, that is to say dialectically, and hence must interpret them irrationally, in terms of surprise or catastrophe or both."

There is some truth in this, but, as a "bourgeois" journalist, I see the failure of my colleagues to be rather in their professional and technical insufficiencies. The revolution is not being described in the American mass-media of communication as a social revolution in its own terms and as a Cuban and Latin American phenomenon. And the value of this book, for all its bias and deficiencies, lies in the fact that the "process" being described is treated as a Cuban social revolution. It may or may not, as the authors see it, be "helping to blaze a new trail for humanity to a brighter socialist future." But it is the most important social upheaval in Latin America since the Mexican Revolution, and it is having a more profound effect on the Western hemisphere than any event since the Wars of Independence 150 years ago.

This is reason enough to welcome the interpretation that is made by Huberman and Sweezy.

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BY ADALGISA NERY

Today we want to recommend to our readers a book of the greatest importance to Brazil and to our people. It is a book written by two American journalists, Paul M. Sweezy and Leo Huberman, and is called *Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution*. It should be required reading for our people. In it almost all the situations described are the same as those in Brazil, and the differences (in our favor, fairly advanced industrialization, something that Cuba does not possess) make our position more serious and place Brazil morally on an inferior plane to heroic and exemplary Cuba.

The book is admirable, a study with data, figures, documents, and incontestable truths concerning what happened in Cuba up to Batista's time, when the policies of the State Department maneuvered the Cuban people into an ocean of misery, humiliation, abasement, inhuman exploitation, and unbelievable degradation. Reading its pages one gets the impression of reading a narrative about the present conditions of the Brazilian people. The same vices, the same corruption implanted at top government levels, the same undermining of economic, financial, and political freedom, the same methods of oppression, the same territorial invasions practiced under the pretext of saving private enterprise, in which officials, friends, relatives, and Batista himself allied themselves to foreign economic groups to sack Cuba and to exhaust the Cubans.

We have the impression that the book, except for small differences, is the present history of Brazil. After reading it, there is no more necessity of listening to the empty speeches of our most brilliant politicians, nor do we need to investigate the fundamentals of our great political parties in search of a proper ideological line. Dear friends, read *Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution* and you can, with great facility, put your finger on the same focus of misery and grief, of political prostitution, of the pulverization of moral and civic principles from which we suffer at present, and which caused Cuba to bleed for the preservation of its rights. Upon turning the last page of *Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution,* we see the explanation for the violent reaction of the United States against Fidel, which is really a violence against the

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Cuban people. This is a book which is essential to the Brazilian conscience, and with regard to the small difference between the conditions of Cuba and Brazil, in spite of the fact that at first sight we appear to have the advantages of a number of small superiorities such as industrial development, actually when we analyze and feel these differences in the light of the facts, they constitute a tremendous moral inferiority and an unqualified cowardice, highlighting the sad and pusillanimous position of Brazil in the realm of our present foreign policy.

Everything important in Brazil is being taken over by foreign monopolies, and this is happening under cover of a hidden cowardice, of a corruption which is hard to imagine on the part of our country's administrators. Our people also are participating in this cowardice, this tremendous corruption, by the simple fact that they don't try to enlighten themselves in the search for the fundamental causes of these afflictions, of their progressive and dramatic misery, produced by the same sources which led Cuba to defend with blood its rich soil, which up to Batista's regime had been manipulated and exploited by international economic groups. For this reason the United States is hiding from the world the historic greatness of Fidel Castro; for this reason the State Department, at the expense of a costly propaganda campaign, claims that Cuba is in the hands of the Communists; because of this, Washington bribes the countries of this hemisphere, including Brazil, so that they will all take a stand against Fidel Castro, on the ridiculous and melancholic grounds that Latin America, in this way, is defending the American type democracy of the Christian-Western world.

Dear readers, instead of paying for the price of a movie, instead of buying a kilo of meat, use the money saved to buy *Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution*. The sacrifice of entertainment or of a steak will be largely compensated by the awakening of your nationalist conscience. Brazil today is to Batista's Cuba what a glove is to a hand. Don't fail to read, urgently, this extraordinary book, which we recommend as a patriotic necessity and a glove for the nationalist spirit.

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First published by Lippincott in 1949, now reissued by MR Press.

THE AUTHOR—Carey McWilliams is the author of *Brothers Under the Skin, Ill Fares the Land, Factories in the Field, A Mask for Privilege,* and other notable works. He served as Commissioner of Immigration and Housing in California (1938-42), and was twice awarded Guggenheim Fellowships for studies in the field of social history. He has been editor of *The Nation* since 1955.

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Now news about another MR Press book—one that takes on added interest in the light of the recent presidential election. The year 1960 marked the emergence of the Spanish-speaking people of the Southwest as a significant factor in national politics. There seems to be no doubt that the Spanish-speaking vote was of especial importance in the results in New Mexico and Texas, and largely accounted for the surprisingly heavy Kennedy vote in Southern California. What is significant, however, is not *how* the Spanish-speaking voted but the fact that, for the first time, they played a key role in a presidential election.

Behind the belated emergence of the Spanish-speaking as a factor to be reckoned with on the national, cultural, and political scene is a socio-economic drama of immense interest and growing importance. Twelve years ago, Carey McWilliams, formerly Commissioner of Immigration and Housing in California and currently editor of *The Nation,* wrote *North From Mexico,* the first book to chronicle the full sweep of the drama of events and people in the borderland of Mexico and the United States. It has been widely recognized as an indispensable source in the study of social tensions in the Southwest. Originally published by Lippincott, *North From Mexico* is now reissued by Monthly Review Press. List price $5.00, special prepublication price $3.00.

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Also recommended: the 31-page, simply-written, 25¢ socialist pamphlet, *Your Best Bet for a Better Life,* by S. S. Mann. Order from Topical Pamphlets, 100 West 23rd St., New York 11, N. Y. And, by Vivian and Vincent Hallinan, "A Clash of Cultures: Some Contrasts in American and Soviet Morals and Manners"; 50¢ a copy, two for $1, five for $2. Order from American Russian Institute, 90 McAllister St., San Francisco 2, California.

The two articles by Paul Baran, entitled *Reflections on the Cuban Revolution,* are now available as a pamphlet—35¢ a copy, 3 for $1, and 20 for $5. The pamphlet will be sent free of charge to all members of MR Associates. It is one of several items on the Cuban Revolution which have been selected by Liberty Prometheus Book Club as its next choice.

Late bulletin: just as we go to press comes exciting news. On Tuesday, March 21, Joan Robinson, the world-famous Cambridge economist, will speak at an MR Associates meeting in New York City. Her topic will be "Anti-Americanism." Be sure to hold the date, and tell your friends about it. An announcement giving further details will be sent to subscribers in a few weeks.

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